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Introduction 
This article provides a brief overview of a research project recently undertaken by the co-
authors which sought to review and analyse the implementation of the Antitrust Damages 
Directive across a selected number of EU Member States (MS. The book based on the project, 
The Antitrust Damages Directive: Transposition in the Member States, was published by OUP 
in December 2018.  The project sought to analyse the transposition of the Directive into 
national law firstly from a generic EU law implementation perspective, considering the MS 
processes followed in implementing the Directive. The book also looks more specifically at the 
national debates and their consequences for the substantive choices adopted in terms of 
implementation of the various Directive provisions. 
While there has been some literature on key substantive aspects of the Directive (see Shaping 
Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe edited by Mel Marquis and Giorgio Monti, Hart 
Studies in Competition Law (Hart, 2018); Competition Damages Directive, First Experiences 
of the New Regime edited by Vladimir Bastidas, Marios Iacovides and Magnus Strand (Hart 
2018) and Harmonising EU Competition Litigation: The New Directive and Beyond edited by 
Maria Bergström, Marios Iacovides, and Magnus Strand (Hart, 2016)) this project was the first 
to deliver a comprehensive and important account of the transposition process and outcomes 
across the EU. 
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Because of the prevalence of private enforcement practice and significance of the 
Directive measures for competition litigation in certain MS, all of the ‘States with considerable 
private enforcement experience’ within the EU were covered by the project: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK. We then selected four countries from 
‘States with developing private enforcement experience’: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Sweden; and three countries from the May 2004 Accession States: Hungary, Poland, and 
Lithuania. Finally we selected two countries from ‘States with limited private enforcement 
experience’: Cyprus and Luxembourg. This article will provide a brief, critical overview of the 
Directive and its key provisions before outlining the findings of the research project comparing 
the transposition processes and outcomes in the selected States.  
 
The Antitrust Damages Directive: An Overview 
The Directive can be considered as another step towards a progressive decentralization of 
enforcement, in which—for the first time—victims of antitrust infringements are given a main 
role in enforcing the competition prohibitions. The Directive firmly empowers them to claim 
damages against infringers if there has been harm that can be proven and traced back to the 
infringement. In this regard, it consolidates the case-law of the ECJ and ultimately also reflects 
the influence of U.S. law,1 where damages claims are the predominant way of making the 
antitrust prohibitions effective.  
The Directive enshrines the right to compensation of anyone harmed by a competition 
infringement and introduces several rules regarding the content, the features, and the exercise 
                                                          
1 The starting point in the U.S. is section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §15): ‘any person 
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws may sue therefor (…) and shall recover threefold damages (….)’. See Niamh Dunne, 
‘Antitrust and the making of European tort law’ (2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21; 
Franck P. Maier-Rigaud, ‘Toward a European Directive on damages actions’ (2014) 10/2 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 347. 
3 
 
of such a right before national courts, but it does not change the traditional dynamics of the 
relationship between EU law and MS’ national laws regarding the conditions in which victims’ 
claims have to be made. National rules on remedies, procedure, and institutions will be 
followed as long as the principles of effectiveness and equivalence are respected. Thus, it 
would clearly be going against the Directive if national rules made the right to compensation 
impossible or excessively difficult. 
However, the Directive marks a meaningful retreat from the principle of MS remedial 
and procedural autonomy by introducing several rules that go, in various respects, beyond the 
mere recognition of the existence of a right to compensation (extending to the amount of 
compensation, limitation period, multiple liability, standing, quantification of harm, and 
binding force of final decisions of NCAs). MS will have to incorporate those rules to comply 
with the Directive. In addition, the Directive further introduces a discovery process to be 
inserted in the domestic civil procedure rules that for most MS is revolutionary. It will be a 
challenge for the parties and for courts to adequately put them into practice when the national 
legal system is not familiar with these tools. 
The harmonization sought by the Directive is limited and fragmented and it extends to 
only some of the issues relevant for the exercise of damages claims. It presents an incoherent 
framework, regulating some issues but not considering or even mentioning other aspects. At 
the same time, the Directive’s provisions are inherently biased in addressing, for the main part, 
issues raised by follow-on claims, damage caused by cartels, and harm flowing downstream. 
Again, in matters upon which the Directive is silent, MS’ domestic rules will continue to 
govern, subject to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
In addition, many of the Directive’s provisions that encroach upon MS remedial or 
procedural autonomy are drafted in a generic or vague manner and this will surely raise 
interpretation problems in the future, which may themselves render damages claims difficult. 
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Questions remain in relation to many issues dealt with by the Directive, starting with its 
temporal scope; but uncertainties also subsist in crucial aspects of multiple liability and claims 
by indirect victims when harm has flown along the supply-distribution chain (and the passing-
on defence). Significantly, the most clear-cut and concise provisions of the Directive are those 
aimed at safeguarding public enforcement of competition law by restricting access to evidence 
in the files of competition authorities provided by immunity beneficiaries or by parties that 
have entered into a settlement agreement with a competition authority. The Directive sets 
absolute and temporal limits on access to these case files to prevent the disruption of public 
enforcement of competition law (leniency and settlement included). Nevertheless, even those 
rules may be controversial, as they run counter to the objective of facilitating damages claims 
since the prompt disclosure of information in a competition authority file may ease the burden 
of proof and assist victims with the quantification of harm. 
In comparison to the pre-existing situation, it may be said that the Directive introduces 
some improvements to the rules and legal tools for bringing a successful antitrust damages 
claims. However, the practitioner and academic critique of many of its provisions may be 
justified. The Directive is short-sighted in omitting any provision to deal with two crucial issues 
that the Commission’s preparatory work identified as being necessary for damages claims to 
be brought: funding of claims and collective redress. No measures were ultimately introduced 
and nor are they expected in the near future. Moreover, some of the legal solutions that are 
provided in the Directive appear too vague or too complex, which will inevitably lead to 
interpretation problems that, in turn, may negatively affect the outcome of damages claims or 
even the incentive to bring claims in the first place. 
Still, a more positive assessment is feasible. Focussing on its shortcomings, legal 
imperfections, and loopholes would not provide a full and accurate appraisal of its potential 
impact. 
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First, the Directive is the most recent step in the EU’s policy of enhancing antitrust 
enforcement by looking at a particular aspect—damages claims by victims—which was not 
previously covered by EU rules; but this does not mean that it is the final or definitive step. At 
this stage, this is the most that the compromise of different affected interests could deliver.2 
The Directive itself provides for its review by the end of 2020 and, depending on its impact, 
amendments can be proposed to correct any weaknesses identified and to improve its rules 
(article 20). 
Second, and more importantly, the Directive is an achievement in itself (as a corollary 
of the work of the European Commission on this subject), representing a significant component 
in competition policy discussion in the EU. The adoption of the Directive and its 
implementation in the MS has created momentum and it has publicised the availability of 
damages claims within the enforcement landscape. The debate around the transposition of the 
Directive has undoubtedly raised business awareness of the use of antitrust claims alternatively 
as a weapon and as a shield, and a significant additional tool in the antitrust enforcement 
portfolio.3 
Third, given that the Directive leaves room for national remedial and procedural 
autonomy, idiosyncratic rules within MS legal systems that do not contravene the principle of 
effectiveness will continue to exist and be applied. With this fragmented and incomplete 
harmonization of the Directive, interested parties will continue to be able to choose to litigate 
their claims in different MS, where they may perceive advantages. 
Finally, it remains to be seen how the new rules adopted by MS in compliance with the 
Directive will enhance or promote damages claims in particular and private enforcement of 
                                                          
2 See ‘“One bird in the hand…” The Directive on damages actions for breach of the competition 
rules’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1333–42. 
3 See David J. Gerber, ‘Private enforcement of competition law: a comparative perspective’ in 
Thomas M. J. Möllers & Andreas Heinemann (eds), The Enforcement of Competition Law in 
Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) 450–1. 
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competition law in general. The Directive will ultimately be regarded as a successful measure 
if it has a positive impact in terms of increasing the amount of successful damages claims in 
the MS national courts. 
Member State Transposition Outcomes 
The project has been particularly novel (though see also the more geographically 
limited work by Piszcz in relation the Central and Eastern European (‘CEE’) States)4, in 
focusing on the transposition of the Directive across the EU MS. For this purpose, a cross-
section of 16 MS were selected to analyse how the Directive was transposed in those MS, 
considering the debates raised about its potential impact and how best to incorporate it within 
the pre-existing national legal provision.  
The central narrative of the Directive and its reception across the States is that it ensures 
a certain minimum level of harmonisation of both important procedural and substantive rules 
which may be of significance for successful damages actions, with notable re-emphasis and 
reiteration of two established central principles: the principles of full compensation and 
effectiveness. Nonetheless, in terms of both transposition process and outcomes, one can 
witness, as evidenced by the national reports, distinctive national contexts and stories. 
Transposition across those 16 MS has involved a variety of different processes, legislative 
measures, stakeholder involvement, level of parliamentary debate, and timescales for 
implementation. In relation to the actual Directive provisions, there has been considerable 
resort to the simple copy-out technique though there have also been aspects of gold-plating, 
particularly in relation to the substantive scope of the Directive’s provisions, albeit with 
considerable divergence across the MS. In some MS certain provisions were not transposed, 
often on the basis that there was already national legal provision for the issue. The transposition 
                                                          
4 Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries 
edited by Anna Piszcz (University of Warsaw Faculty Management Press, 2017)). 
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of some provisions, for instance in relation to the binding effect of infringement decisions, 
clearly caused controversy in some MS, and there is also the possibility that some of the ways 
in which certain provisions were transposed will indeed be incompatible with the Directive. 
One of the underlying problems here, recognised in some of the transposition processes, was 
that the Directive was essentially drafted by a public agency lacking familiarity with the 
particularities and divergences in national procedural, private, and indeed constitutional law 
provision across the EU. Despite this, it has been acknowledged that certain provisions 
introduce significant and important claimant-favourable changes to existing practice, for 
instance in relation to the time-bar limitation rules and knowledge requirement for triggering 
the limitation period, as discussed particularly in relation to the UK context. The provisions on 
discovery and access to documentation are particularly interesting in that the key provision in 
Article 5 required little or no change to existing legal provision in a few MS, whilst in most 
States the rules were perceived as constituting a dramatic change in traditional modes of 
litigation practice. Notwithstanding these different impacts, the new provisions ironically also 
constitute arguably a retrograde step (at least from the perspective of potential cartel damages 
claimants) by backtracking from prior ECJ (and national) jurisprudence to automatically 
exclude litigant access to leniency application-based information. 
Problems and Limitations in the Transposition of the Directive 
Nonetheless, the key problems in implementing the Directive concern the gaps around 
and behind the framework of many of the legal provisions as set out therein. Some of the 
Directive’s rules are drafted in broad and uncertain terms, providing discretion in their 
implementation, and many MS have opted for leaving to the national courts the task of 
interpreting them. Indeed, there are a number of unresolved and complicated issues, for 
instance around the practical application of the rules on the presumption of harm, passing-on, 
and quantification of damages, that are particularly important in ensuring the practical impact 
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of the Directive on successful competition damages litigation. There are a range of specific 
issues where the precise application of the provision has been neither clarified by the general 
terms of the Directive nor its equivalent transposition measure, and there is consequently both 
considerable uncertainty remaining and/or or the MS have adopted different views on how best 
and most appropriately to implement the provision. This is evidenced clearly for instance in 
relation to a number of key issues which may be central to establishing liability and which have 
already been considered by courts (or at least in theoretical debates considered by the national 
rapporteurs); three such key issues being causality and the fault requirements, how to determine 
liability within groups of companies and how to apportion joint and several liability between 
co-infringers. In the short term, at least, there is a serious risk of inconsistency in approach 
between different national courts and consequently the potential and incentive for forum-
shopping across the MS. Moreover, certain fundamental mechanisms, institutions, and rules, 
which are essential for a thorough and effective system of competition law damages actions, 
have been omitted completely from the Directive framework. These issues are effectively 
unregulated at the EU level and left to MS to make appropriate provision. The most significant 
absence is any Directive provision for collective redress (albeit noting the Commission’s 2013 
Recommendation on the issue), although some MS have taken the opportunity of the 
transposition process to review and reconsider their approach to consumer/collective redress in 
the competition law context. Besides, the Directive has no provision in relation to specialised 
or centralised court structures within MS for dealing with competition litigation, and there is a 
growing consensus about the value of a specialised judiciary in this context. Finally, there is 
no Directive provision dealing with either litigation costs or funding mechanisms, appropriate 
mechanisms for which are essential to creating a vibrant competition Bar and which make 
different legal systems more attractive to competition claimants. Accordingly, there is both 
uncertainty and some scepticism across the MS about the extent to which the Directive and the 
9 
 
national transposition measures will produce a significant impact on the levels and success of 
competition damages actions. However, to a great extent this is dependent on the number and 
quality of public infringement decisions for subsequent follow-on cases, and consequently help 
to establish a sustained body of litigation practice thereby enhancing awareness of competition 
law culture and rights. In the meantime, it is likely that the larger MS, notably Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK (at least until Brexit has an impact) will continue to be the most 
attractive fora for much of the pan-European damages litigation actions at least. 
Concluding remarks 
It is suggested that many of the substantive issues established by the Directive 
provisions and implemented by the transposition measures will require further interpretation 
by national courts, and subsequently the ECJ. The transposition of the Antitrust Damages 
Directive can be viewed as part of a slow process of minimal harmonisation of aspects of the 
procedural and substantive rules surrounding private antitrust enforcement, set in the context 
of national institutional, substantive, and procedural contexts and rules, and the overarching 
EU law requirement that these contexts ensure the effectiveness of EU law rights. There are 
already challenges to pre-existing national provisions in light of the Directive and it will be 
interesting to follow the development of the ECJ case-law in the near future in determining the 
compatibility of MS legal systems post-transposition with the effectiveness of EU law. 
This new regime has introduced special rules for antitrust damages actions which 
derogate a great number of general principles and rules of the domestic legal orders of several 
MS. The Directive has already led to changes beyond its strict scope, namely as a result of the 
MS option to harmonise the rules applicable to EU law and to purely national law 
infringements. But it is possible that the existence of these special rules in the legal orders of 
the MS, relating to access to evidence, to time-barring, etc, which were introduced because 
they were deemed necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the rights being protected, will, in 
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the long run, lead to a broader debate about the justification of the more restrictive general 
regimes. The Damages Directive may prove to be just one of the first steps in a much wider 
reform of the legal systems of the MS. 
 
